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ABSTRACT
To deter corporate crime, corporate sanctions must be structured
to induce large corporations to help federal prosecutors detect and pun-
ish corporate crime. Specifically, firms must be encouraged to detect
and report wrongdoing, and to cooperate with the government's effort to
identify and sanction the individuals responsible for the crime. Firms
will not engage in these activities unless they face lower expected sanc-
tions if they detect, report, and cooperate than if they do not. This article
examines whether the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines achieve
this objective and shows that they do not. Although the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines offer sanction mitigation to firms that adopt
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effective compliance programs, self-report, and cooperate, this article
shows that these provisions offer too little mitigation to encourage firms
to detect, report, and cooperate. Indeed, the Guidelines' mitigation pro-
visions are particularly inadequate in the very circumstances where cor-
porate detection and investigation is most important: in cases involving
crimes committed by managers of large firms. As a result, U.S. efforts to
deter corporate crime are undermined by adherence to the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines. This may partly explain why the Depart-
ment of Justice adopted an alternative strategy for encouraging
corporate reporting and cooperation, one that differs materially from
the Organizational Guidelines. To help deter corporate crime, the Sen-
tencing Commission should reform the Guidelines.
Both the strength of the U.S. economy and the well-being of our
citizens depend, in part, on our ability to deter corporate crime, espe-
cially by large corporations. Yet the government cannot effectively deter
corporate crime by large firms on its own. Federal authorities need to
induce firms to help them detect and sanction wrongdoers.
Federal authorities cannot deter crime effectively unless they can
ensure that employees (including managers) who commit crimes face
expected penalties that exceed the benefit they get from committing the
crime. This simple goal is not easy to achieve, however, because wrong-
doing often is not detected and individual wrongdoers often escape sanc-
tion. Thus, in order to effectively deter corporate crime, the government
needs to ensure that it can reliably and cost-effectively detect wrongdo-
ing and identify and sanction the individuals within the firm who are
ultimately responsible for the crime.' In the case of large firms, the gov-
ernment often cannot cost-effectively detect wrongdoing on its own.
The most effective way to detect wrongdoing and identify and sanction
wrongdoers is to induce corporations to detect and report crimes by their
employees and help the government obtain the evidence it needs to iden-
tify and convict the individuals responsible. Firms can do this by adopt-
ing compliance programs ex ante that detect crime, and by intervening
ex post to investigate and report suspected wrongs and fully cooperate
with the government's effort to identify and sanction the individual
1. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). The government would not need to invest in detection if it could
feasibly impose unlimited sanctions on individuals. In the real world, the government cannot
impose unlimited sanctions. Thus, to optimally deter crime it must increase the expected sanction
by increasing the probability that wrongdoing is detected and sanctioned. E.g., Jennifer Arlen,
Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
(Keith Hylton & Alon Harel eds.) (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author) (discussing why
optimal deterrence requires expenditures on enforcement, which in turn implies that optimal
deterrence generally requires corporate expenditures on detection, investigation, and cooperation).
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responsible for the crime. These measures, hereinafter referred to as
"corporate policing," help deter crime by increasing the probability that
individual wrongdoers are criminally sanctioned if they violate the law.
Accordingly, in order to deter corporate crime, the government needs to
induce firms to adopt effective compliance programs, self-report wrong-
doing, and fully cooperate with enforcement authorities to bring individ-
ual wrongdoers to justice.2
Corporate liability, both criminal and civil, remains the most effec-
tive way to achieve these goals. But corporate liability is only effective
if it is structured to ensure that firms are better off when they undertake
effective measures to detect wrongdoing and help the government con-
vict wrongdoers than when they do not.' Corporate criminal liability
thus cannot serve its central purpose unless it is structured to provide
firms with strong incentives to detect and self-report violations, as well
as to cooperate with governmental authorities' efforts to sanction indi-
vidual wrongdoers. Indeed, corporate sanctions undermine the central
purpose of corporate liability when firms face higher expected sanctions
when they engage in optimal corporate policing than when they do not.4
In the United States, criminal liability of firms convicted of most
federal crimes is in effect governed by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Governing Organizations.' The United States Sentencing Commission
adopted the Organizational Guidelines with the clear purpose of deter-
ring corporate crime.' The Commission was particularly concerned
2. See id.
3. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 699 (1997) (concluding that corporate
liability should be designed to induce firms to adopt prevention and policing measures, where
corporate policing includes compliance programs designed to detect wrongdoing, corporate
reporting of wrongdoing, and corporate cooperation with prosecutors); Arlen, Corporate Criminal
Liability, supra note 1, at manuscript at 58; see also Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 45 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 275, 289 (2008). The conclusion that corporate penalties
must be designed to induce firms to prevent, detect, and self-report wrongdoing, cooperate with
authorities, and, where possible, remediate the harm caused, applies equally to civil and criminal
enforcement. Arlen & Kraakman, supra; Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1.
4. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3; see also Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra
note 1.
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2010) [hereinafter ORGANIZATIONAL
GUIDELINES]. In 2005, the Guidelines became advisory, and not mandatory. See United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (rendering the individual guidelines advisory). Nevertheless,
the Guidelines can be expected to significantly influence corporate criminal sanctions even though
they are now advisory. See Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A. Cohen, Regulating
Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J. L. &
EcON. 393, 414-17 (1999) (finding that following the adoption of the Organizational Guidelines
judges imposed higher total sanctions (criminal, civil, and administrative) on publicly-held firms
than they did previously, even in cases where they were not required to apply the Organizational
Guidelines).
6. One of the primary purposes of the Guidelines was to reform Organizational Sentencing
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about wrongdoing by employees of large firms. Towards that end it
adopted Guidelines designed to substantially increase the criminal fines
imposed on large firms.' It also structured criminal fines in a way that it
hoped would encourage corporations to adopt effective compliance pro-
grams, self-report detected crimes, and fully cooperate with the govern-
ment's efforts to investigate and sanction wrongdoing.8
The Sentencing Commission recognized that government authori-
ties could not induce effective corporate policing if it retained the tradi-
tional approach to corporate liability.' Under the traditional rule of
respondeat superior, firms are strictly liable for employee crimes com-
mitted in the scope of employment, even if the firm tried to prevent,
eventually detected, and reported the wrong. Moreover, firms engaging
in effective corporate policing could not be sure that their efforts would
entitle them to a substantial reduction in the fine. o This traditional
approach had perverse effects. It tended to discourage firms from inter-
vening aggressively to help the government detect and sanction corpo-
rate crimes because corporate efforts to help the government could hurt
the firm by increasing its probability of being held criminally liable." In
order to induce corporate policing, federal authorities needed to adopt a
"duty-based composite regime," under which firms are held liable for
their employees crimes, but the amount of liability would be substan-
practice to better deter corporate crime. Congress reaffirmed that deterrence is a central goal of
organizational sanctions when it instructed the Sentencing Commission to review and amend the
Sentencing Guidelines to ensure that the provisions that apply to organizations "are sufficient to
deter . . . organizational criminal conduct." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 802. Deterrence was not the only goal. Additional goals include the
need to provide restitution to victims and "just punishment." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 5 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/OrganizationalGuidelines/HistoricalDevelopment/OrgGL8309
1.pdf. In addition, the Organizational Guidelines also were originally intended to restrain judicial
discretion. The Guidelines promoted this goal by requiring judges to impose fines falling within
the range provided by the Guidelines, except in specific circumstances. See supra note 5 (noting
that the Guidelines are now advisory but still influential).
7. See Alexander, Arlen & Cohen, supra note 5, at 414-17 (providing evidence that the
Organizational Guidelines achieved their goal of increasing the criminal fines imposed on large
firms by showing that the criminal fines imposed on publicly-held firms were higher in cases
where judges were constrained to apply the Organizational Guidelines than in post-Guidelines
where the Organizational Guidelines were only advisory).
8. Fines also were structured to serve other aims. See supra text accompanying note 6
(discussing the multiple goals of the Guidelines). But one important goal of fine mitigation is-
and should be-to encourage firms to engage in effective corporate policing. This is evident from
the Guidelines provisions that specify the desired structure of an "effective" corporate compliance
program, as well as the mitigation provisions that reward firms that adopt an effective compliance
program, self-report, and cooperate. See ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, introductory cmt.
9. See ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, introductory cmt.
10. See generally Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 4-5 (discussing the
traditional rules governing corporate criminal liability).
11. See Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1, at 842-43.
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tially reduced (and perhaps shifted from criminal to civil) if the firm
satisfied any (or each) of its policing duties: specifically adopting an
effective compliance program, self-reporting detected wrongs, and fully
cooperating with federal investigations.12
To encourage corporate policing, the Sentencing Commission
adopted Organizational Guidelines that formally embraced a form of
"duty-based" composite corporate criminal liability, under which corpo-
rations that satisfy a set of policing duties face a lower criminal sanction
than those that did not. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines pro-
vide that firms are entitled to a reduction in their corporate criminal fine
if: (i) the firm had an effective compliance program and promptly
reported any detected wrongdoing; (ii) the firm self-reported the wrong,
fully cooperated and accepted responsibility; or (iii) the firm fully coop-
erated and accepted responsibility."
This Article shows that the Sentencing Commission failed to adopt
an effective regime." To deter wrongdoing, criminal penalties must be
structured to ensure that firms face a lower expected corporate penalty"
if they adopt an effective compliance program, self-report, or fully coop-
erate than if they do not, even though corporate policing increases the
probability that the firm will be sanctioned for any crimes its employees
commit. This article shows that the Organizational Guidelines do not
provide firms with sufficient mitigation to ensure that firms face lower
expected sanctions if they undertake effective corporate policing when
corporate policing substantially increases the probability that the govern-
ment can detect and sanction the wrong.16 Moreover, the perverse
effects of the Guidelines are greatest in the very circumstances where
effective sanction mitigation is most needed: specifically, large firms
with wrongs that implicate managers. These crimes can be particularly
difficult for the government to detect and sanction without corporate
monitoring, self-reporting, or cooperation. Yet, perversely, the Guide-
lines offer the least percentage mitigation for policing to large firms con-
12. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 753 (detailing an optimal duty-based corporate
liability regime); see also Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1 (finding that duty-
based corporate liability can eliminate the perverse effects of respondeat superior).
13. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(f)-(g).
14. This article expands on a relatively brief analysis of this issue provided by Arlen &
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 745-49.
15. The expected criminal sanction is the criminal sanction multiplied by the probability that
the government detects the violation and sanctions the firm.
16. To further compound matters, corporations cannot be sure of what the sanction would
have been absent policing or what it will be with policing because judges have discretion as to
whether to apply the Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
Moreover, even if they do apply the Guidelines, judges have considerable discretion concerning
what fine to impose within the Guidelines fine range.
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victed of crimes involving managers and to firms with a past history of
wrongdoing. Thus, rather than helping to deter crime, the Guidelines
discourage firms from monitoring, self-reporting, and cooperating by
imposing greater expected costs on firms that monitor, self-report, and
cooperate than on those that do not. The problems with the Guidelines
are sufficiently serious that their application threatens to undermine the
central purpose of federal corporate criminal enforcement.
The conclusion that the Organizational Guidelines do not provide
firms with adequate incentives to adopt effective compliance programs,
self-report, and fully cooperate is supported by evidence that the dura-
tion of corporate crimes by publicly-held firms stayed the same after the
adoption of the Guidelines as before." This is consistent with the
hypothesis that the Guidelines had little effect on detection and
reporting.
Beyond this, it is worth noting that the Department of Justice (DOJ)
no longer relies primarily on the incentives provided by the Organiza-
tional Guidelines to induce corporate policing. Approximately eight
years after the adoption of the Organizational Guidelines, the DOJ for-
mally adopted a policy designed to provide firms with far greater incen-
tives to engage in effective policing than is offered by the Guidelines.
Specifically, in 1999, then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued
a memorandum to prosecutors detailing the factors they should consider
when deciding whether to indict a corporation for its employees'
crimes.' 8 These guidelines encouraged prosecutors not to prosecute
firms that engage in specified good corporate conduct, even when firms
could be held criminally liable through respondeat superior and would
have been fined under the Organizational Guidelines. Following the
Holder Memo, prosecutors increasingly have chosen not to prosecute
firms if the crime occurred despite effective corporate policing, espe-
cially if the firm reported the crime and cooperated.19 Firms exempt
17. Alexander, Arlen & Cohen, supra note 5, at 407-08.
18. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 6, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/
CorpProseclHolderMemo_6_16_99.pdf [hereinafter Holder Memo]; see also Memorandum
from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S.
Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.800, available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousalfoia.reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
19. The Sentencing Commission's data provides evidence to support the conclusion that most
firms that self-report avoid formal conviction, and thus avoid sentencing under the Organizational
Guidelines, at least for financial crimes and others involving fraud. This support comes from
evidence that only one firm convicted each year self-reported the wrong on average (according to
the Commission's data). Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 13 (Table Six). But
see Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 22, 41) (on file with author) (finding both that many convicted firms are not
[Vol. 66:321326
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from criminal prosecution still are subject to penalties (including
remediation and forfeiture), which often are imposed through Deferred
or Non-Prosecution Agreements (DPA or NPA, respectively). Yet the
magnitude of mitigation produced by the decision not to convict (in con-
cert with the monetary penalty reduction) is enormous. The DOJ policy
favoring non-prosecution of firms that undertake effective policing
(especially cooperation) provides stronger incentive for firms to adopt
effective compliance programs, self-report, and fully cooperate than is
produced by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.2 0 Moreover, an
increasing number of federal prosecutors are addressing compliance fail-
ures through a combination of smaller penalties, direct mandates, and
monitoring, as opposed to relying primarily on the threat of substantial
sanctions for non-compliance. 2 1 The DOJ's non-prosecution policy pro-
vides some evidence that federal enforcement officials have decided that
included in the Commission's data; some convicted firms fully cooperated and some appear to
have self-reported). By contrast, each year, many firms avoid conviction but are subject to non-
prosecution agreements (NPA) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPA). Almost all of these
firms fully cooperated and many self-reported the wrong. Thus, through this leniency program,
combined with the DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ has created an alternative sanctioning regime to
govern firms that engage in good corporate conduct. The DOJ appears to believe that this
alternative regime is more effective at inducing compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation than
the Organizational Guidelines.
For a discussion of the content of the DOJ's DPAs and NPAs, see, e.g., Jennifer Arlen &
Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution (April 5, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REv. 853, 888-99 (2007); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the
'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
159, 160-61 (2008); see also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MIcH. L. REV. 1713 (2007). For a discussion of the
evolution of the role of publicly-held firms in criminal cases, see Harry First, Branch Office of the
Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV.
23, 32-58 (2010); see also Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1613 (2007). For a discussion of evidence that some firms are convicted even though they
self-report (and more are convicted than the Commission reports), see infra note 21; Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra, at 41. For a discussion of problems with the
Sentencing Commission's data on corporate crimes, see Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen &
Mark A. Cohen, Evaluating Trends in Corporate Sentencing: How Reliable are the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's Data?, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 108 (2000); Garrett, Globalized Corporate
Prosecutions, supra, at 22.
20. In the case of certain crimes, firms want to avoid conviction, independent of the fine,
because the collateral consequences to them of conviction for certain crimes are enormous. See
generally Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 (discussing the collateral
consequences of conviction); Assaf Hamdami & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence,
61 STAN. L. REv. 271, 279 (2008) (same).
21. For a discussion of prosecutors' increased willingness to use DPAs and NPAs to impose
mandated compliance programs, corporate monitors, and other structural reforms on firms that
otherwise will be eligible for conviction, see, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the
Boardroom: Deterring Crime Without Prosecutor Interference in Corporate Governance, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT
76-81 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Arlen & Kahan, supra note 19;
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they need to provide stronger incentives to induce corporate policing
than those provided by the Guidelines.
Nevertheless, the Organizational Guidelines-and their defects-
are still important because the Guidelines continue to determine the
sanctions imposed on many firms even when the firm engaged in some
effective policing. This is because many U.S. Attorneys continue to con-
vict firms even when the firm had an effective compliance program,
fully cooperated, or undertook other policing measures. 2 2 These con-
victed firms generally in effect remain under the Guidelines. 23 Thus,
many firms still reasonably look to the Organizational Guidelines in
determining whether to monitor, self-report, or cooperate. The problems
with the Guidelines identified in this article thus continue to undermine
efforts to induce firms to intervene aggressively to detect and report
crime and to help convict individual wrongdoers. 24 Thus, to effectively
Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 19; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 19;
Spivack & Raman, supra note 19.
22. Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 11-12 (providing evidence that
some firms are convicted even though they self-reported or had an effective compliance program);
see also Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 19 (finding that foreign and
domestic firms often are convicted even when they fully cooperated). Firms that face criminal
liability for antitrust, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and environmental violations appear
to be particularly vulnerable to conviction despite full cooperation. In the case of antitrust (e.g.,
cartels) and FCPA, there is some evidence that federal prosecutors tend to reserve leniency for
firms that self-report and generally only grant leniency to the first firm in the cartel (antitrust) or
industry (FCPA) to self-report. Id. at 33. Thus, the remaining firms can expect to have their
sanctions governed by the Organizational Guidelines (or, in the case of Antitrust, the Antitrust
Guidelines), when they decide whether to cooperate. It appears that the environmental division
also almost never makes use of DPAs and NPAs and tends to convict firms even when they self-
report (although they grant sanction mitigation). For a discussion of how government actors'
preference for retributive, rather than deterrence-based, responses to corporate crime may explain
why some federal prosecutors under-utilize leniency as a reward for self-reporting and
cooperation, see Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
23. Technically, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines govern the sanctions imposed on
corporations for most corporate crimes, whether the firm is convicted following a trial or a plea
agreement (although prosecutors can adjust pleas to adjust the sanction as well). The Guidelines
do not govern all crimes, however. For example, antitrust violations are governed by a separate set
of Guidelines. Alexander, Arlen & Cohen, supra note 5, at 397. In addition, the fine provisions of
the Organizational Guidelines do not apply to most environmental, wildlife, food, drug, safety, or
export control violations, although the Guidelines do apply if the crime also involves conduct
covered by the Guidelines. Id.; see also RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND
SENTENCING 436 (1994).
24. Indeed, even the U.S. Sentencing Commission eventually realized that its original
mitigation provisions governing firms that adopt an effective compliance program were too
restrictive. Under the original Organizational Guidelines, firms were in effect ineligible for fine
mitigation for adopting an effective compliance program if the crime involved high-level
personnel. In 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the Organizational Guidelines to
eliminate the prohibition on granting penalty mitigation to firms that have an effective compliance
program if the violation involved any high-level personnel. See ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES
§ 8C2.5(f)(3)(C). The Sentencing Commission's new mitigation provision permits penalty
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deter corporate crime, the Sentencing Commission must reform the
Organizational Guidelines to provide firms with stronger incentives to
help federal authorities deter corporate crime.
This article proceeds as follows: Section One shows why govern-
ment authorities cannot hope to effectively deter corporate crime by
larger firms unless firms undertake effective corporate policing. It also
explains why the state needs to employ optimal duty-based liability to
induce optimal corporate policing. Section Two shows that the Organi-
zational Guidelines' mitigation provisions fail to provide many firms
with adequate incentives to adopt an effective compliance program. The
Guidelines also provide inadequate incentives for firms to self-report
wrongdoing or cooperate in many circumstances. Finally, Section Two
shows that the problems with the Guidelines are greatest where corpo-
rate policing appears to be most needed: when corporate crime is hard to
detect because the crime is committed by those in authority. Section
Three discusses the change in DOJ enforcement practice which provides
far greater incentive to undertake effective policing measures than the
Guidelines. Section Four concludes.
1. GOALS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
A primary purpose, if not the primary purpose, of liability for cor-
porate crimes is to deter corporate crime in a way that maximizes social
welfare. This goal should inform both individual and corporate liability
for crimes committed by employees acting in the scope of employment,
ostensibly on behalf of the firm. It should extend to both criminal and
civil liability.
As this section shows, corporate liability deters crime in different
ways than individual liability. As a result of these differences, corporate
liability often must be structured differently than individual liability.
Pure individual liability falls directly on the people who cause corporate
crimes. It directly deters crime by directly increasing wrongdoers'
mitigation for an effective compliance program even if the crime involved high-level personnel,
provided that the individuals in the firm with operational responsibility for the compliance
program report directly to the board of directors (or similar governing body), the firm detects and
reports the wrong, and no individual with operational responsibility for compliance participated
in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense. Id. While the Sentencing Commission has
improved its guidelines through this amendment, the Organizational Guidelines have additional
problems identified in this article. Moreover, even the amendment is not an adequate solution to
the mitigation issue because it only grants mitigation for a compliance program in cases involving
high-level personnel if the firm actually detects the wrong. This limitation appears aimed at the
increased risk that a firm's compliance program will not be truly effective when high-level
personnel commit crimes. This concern would be better addressed in another way than a blanket
limitation on credit for compliance program adoption for these crimes unless the firm detects (and
reports) the wrong.
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expected costs of committing crimes.2 5 By contrast, corporate liability
falls on those who own the company, and not directly on individual
wrongdoers. In some cases, this distinction is not important, such as
when crimes are committed (or condoned) by the firm's controlling
shareholders (who also directly manage the firm). In this situation, cor-
porate liability operates to deter wrongdoing largely in the same way as
individual liability-by imposing a cost directly on the individuals
responsible for the crime.2 6 In many other situations, however, corporate
shareholders are not involved in either the day-to-day management or
the firm's criminal activities. In this situation, corporate liability does
not fall directly on those responsible for the crime. Thus, the question is,
why should firms ever be liable when corporate shareholders do not
directly manage the firm and did not (and could not) commit the crime?
Corporate liability is important in this context because firms are
uniquely positioned to deter their employees from committing crimes.
First, firms directly affect-and indeed often determine-the degree to
which their employees benefit from most corporate crimes. In addition,
they can increase their employees' expected cost of crime. They can do
this directly through ex ante actions that make crimes harder to commit
as well as through ex post sanctions.2 7 They also can increase their
employees' expected sanctions through actions that increase the
probability that the government detects crime and sanctions wrongdoers
(corporate policing). Corporate liability should be structured to ensure
that firms want to intervene optimally to detect and investigate suspi-
cious activities, as well as to self-report crimes and fully cooperate with
government efforts to bring individual wrongdoers to justice.2 8
This Section examines the ways in which firms can deter corporate
crime, focusing on crimes by larger firms (specifically, those that do not
have a controlling shareholder involved in the day-to-day management
of the firm who is complicit in the crime). This Section then explains the
implications of this analysis for corporate liability.
A. Corporate Deterrence
The optimal corporate response to the possibility of a legal viola-
tion depends on the nature of the violation. Legal violations can be use-
25. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169
(1968).
26. Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 18-19.
27. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 706. Firms also can lower the expected benefit to
employees of crime by changing their compensation structure. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal
Liability, supra note 1, at 26.
28. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 691.
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fully divided into two categories.2 9 The first category is intentional
wrongs: wrongs that corporate employees commit for their own benefit
with knowledge that they are violating the law. Intentional wrongs
include genuine fraud and certain forms of market manipulation, such as
where a manager knowingly manipulates the market in an effort to boost
profits in his unit, and thereby preserve his job or obtain a promotion or
bonus. In the case of intentional wrongdoing, the government must
ensure that individuals do not expect to benefit from violating the law.
To do this, federal authorities must impose sanctions directly on the
individuals responsible for such violations.3 0 Federal authorities often
cannot reliably ensure that wrongdoers are punished unless they can
induce firms to intervene to deter, detect, or report wrongdoers.
Corporations can deter intentional wrongdoing in a variety of ways.
First, corporations can deter intentional wrongdoing by reducing
employees' incentives to violate the law. Employees generally prefer not
to violate the law, but sometimes will if they face strong pressure to do
so.3 1 Often employees intentionally violate the law in an effort to either
save their jobs or earn a financial reward, such as when the wrong
appears to be the only way the firm will gain the sales, profits, or
increased stock price needed to preserve the employee's job or justify a
promotion or raise. Corporations can reduce their employees' incentives
to commit this type of wrong by ensuring that employees' tenure and
salary do not depend on short-run performance measures, such as quar-
terly profits, revenues, sales or stock price, and takes into account com-
pliance. Firms also can deter intentional violations by creating a
corporate culture that promotes legal compliance. An effective culture of
compliance can help deter violations both by imposing direct psycholog-
ical costs on the person committing it and by making it harder to obtain
the complicity of others needed to commit or conceal many corporate
violations.
Beyond this, corporations can deter intentional wrongdoing by
increasing the expected cost to potential wrongdoers of individual liabil-
ity for any crimes they commit. Corporations can increase the expected
cost to potential wrongdoers of threatened civil or criminal penalties by
29. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 14.
30. Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1, at 834-35.
31. For evidence that corporate crimes generally are committed by managers for personal
benefit, see, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of
Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 423 (1996); Cindy R. Alexander &
Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and
Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1999); see also Jennifer H. Arlen & William J.
Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 691, 703 (1992) (providing theory and evidence that managers commit securities fraud for
personal benefit).
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increasing the likelihood that individuals who violate the law are sanc-
tioned. Corporations can increase the probability of sanction in a variety
of ways: (1) monitoring to detect wrongdoing;3 2 (2) investigating suspi-
cious activities; (3) reporting violations to federal authorities; and (4)
cooperating with authorities to help them identify and sanction the indi-
viduals responsible for the violation. Measures that increase the
probability that the government can sanction the violation are referred to
as "policing measures."3 3
The second category of violations is unintentional. This category
includes laws that the firm can violate even when its employees invest
optimally in effort to prevent the violation.34 Employees normally do not
directly benefit from violating these laws. They generally will comply if
they know the legal requirements and they do not bear the direct costs of
compliance (or have adequate incentives to comply in any event). In
such situations, as with intentional crimes, firms can deter crime by
investing in prevention, detection, and post-violation policing. In this
case, the firm can help prevent crime through measures (such as compli-
ance programs) that ensure that employees know the law, reduce the
direct cost to employees of compliance, and promote a culture of com-
pliance. Corporations also can deter unintentional crimes through polic-
ing measures that increase the threat presented by government sanctions.
As with intentional crimes, these measures include monitoring pro-
grams, self-reporting, and cooperation with government efforts to bring
individual wrongdoers to justice. These activities can deter unintentional
violations in two ways. First, employees generally will respond to the
increased threat of sanctions by exerting more effort to comply with the
law. Second, policing measures designed to deter wrongs can reduce the
social cost of any ongoing wrongs that do occur, such as environmental
violations, by enabling the state to detect, stop, and intervene to correct
violations more quickly than they otherwise would be able to.
Accordingly, we see that whether crime is intentional or uninten-
tional, corporate policing is essential to optimal deterrence of corporate
crime. Government authorities generally cannot deter corporate crime
effectively unless firms engage in optimal policing because corporations
32. See Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1, at 842.
33. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 699.
34. An employee invests optimally in effort to comply with the law when he invests up to the
point where the additional cost of the last unit of effort just equals the resulting benefit, where the
benefit is the impact of effort on the probability the violation occurs, multiplied by the social cost
of the violation. See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1980) (defining optimal care). In those situations where the cost of a violation is truly
enormous, and the cost to the firm of avoiding any risk of a violation is not prohibitive, optimal
effort may absolutely deter any risk of a violation.
35. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 691.
332 [Vol. 66:321
2012] FAILURE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 333
often are the lowest-cost providers of many forms of policing. This is
particularly true when the firm is large. Firms can more cost effectively
monitor ex ante to detect violations because they know their internal
operations better than the state does, and thus have better information
about the types of crime their employees might commit and where the
evidence of such crimes would manifest. Corporate monitoring for crime
also is more cost-effective than monitoring by the state because firms
already collect (or should collect) much of the information needed to
detect wrongs in the ordinary course of business. 36
Firms also can deter crimes by undertaking effective policing ex
post, after the crime occurs. Ex post policing includes investigating sus-
picious activities, self-reporting any detected wrongs to government
authorities, and fully cooperating with the government's efforts to iden-
tify the individuals responsible for the crime and obtain the evidence
needed to convict them. Corporate policing is important because corpo-
rations are better able to detect most types of crimes than the govern-
ment because they know how their operations should run when done
legally." They also generally can investigate wrongdoing at a lower cost
than the government because they know from which employees to
obtain evidence. They also have immediate access to their own internal
documents and employees. Thus, the government can dramatically
reduce the cost and improve the accuracy of criminal investigations by
inducing firms to conduct genuine and thorough investigations and share
their findings with the government. The need to induce corporate polic-
ing is particularly great in the case of larger firms with complex internal
structures."
Finally, firms can deter crime by adopting prevention measures.
Prevention measures do not increase the probability of detection.
Instead, they either reduce the direct benefit to the employees of crime
or make the crime more difficult or costly to commit. Corporate preven-
tion is particularly important in the case of firms where ownership is
separated from day-to-day control. This is because the firm directly
determines the incentives that its managers and other employees have to
36. Id.; Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 28.
37. Firms are particularly likely to be the lower cost detectors of crimes when the crime does
not produce an obvious harm and the boundary between legitimate activities and the wrong
depends on the employee's intent. Fraud is just such a crime. Corporate detection is less important
for crimes, such as massive oil spills, that are open and obvious, especially if intent is either
obvious or is not needed to establish the crime.
38. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 747; Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note
1, at 30. For a discussion of the problems and challenges with this approach, see Miriam Hechler
Baer, Cooperation's Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 903 (2011); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled
Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311 (2007); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 917 (2008).
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commit corporate crimes because non-owner employees generally do
not directly benefit from corporate crime, but instead benefit indirectly
as a result of corporate promotion and compensation policies. Corporate
crimes generally directly impact the firm, and not individual employees.
Employees are motivated to commit the crime by the hope that they will
benefit personally through actions, such as crime, that increase the
firm's profits, sales, or reported earnings. This benefit generally takes
the form of increased compensation or increased job security awarded to
those who help the firm increase short-run profits. When firms tie
employee rewards to short-run performance, employees may benefit
from committing crimes that benefit the firm in the short-run, even when
the long-run impact on the firm is negative. Firms can help deter these
crimes by restructuring their compensation and promotion policies to
focus employee compensation and retention decisions on the firm's
long-run returns, not short-term outcomes."
B. Using Liability to Induce Corporate Deterrence
Accordingly, in order to optimally deter crime by corporations-
especially by larger firms-federal authorities generally need to induce
firms to engage in optimal (1) prevention; (2) ex ante policing (monitor-
ing); and (3) ex post policing (investigation, self-reporting, and full
cooperation). All of these measures are expensive, however. Corporate
boards of directors are obligated to ensure that the firm undertakes those
measures only to the extent that they benefit the firm by maximizing
long-run profits (or are mandated by law, which most are not). This
implies that the government cannot expect firms to invest adequately in
prevention, detection, and post-violation policing unless the firm's
expected profits are higher (and thus expected costs are lower) when the
firm undertakes optimal prevention, monitoring, and ex post policing
than when it does not. This imposes two requirements on corporate lia-
bility. First, when the direct cost of the crime falls on third parties not
shareholders,4 0 the government must impose liability on firms to ensure
that they have a direct financial incentive to adopt optimal prevention
measures. In addition, federal authorities must structure liability to
ensure that firms are better off investing optimally in (1) ex ante policing
(detection); and (2) post-violation policing (self-reporting and coopera-
tion) than they are if they do not.4 '
39. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 704; Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note
1, at 27.
40. For a discussion of optimal corporate liability for one of the only crimes where publicly-
held firm shareholders bear the cost of crime, securities fraud, see Arlen & Carney, supra note 31;
Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 55-56.
41. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 707; see also Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability,
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Federal authorities face a challenge in attempting to induce optimal
prevention and policing because the corporate liability rule needed to
induce optimal prevention will not induce optimal policing, and vice
versa. As a result, federal authorities need to employ a composite rule
that combines strict corporate liability for all employee crimes that harm
third parties (as needed to induce optimal prevention) with duty-based
liability designed to induce optimal policing.
Prevention measures simply deter wrongdoing-thereby reducing
the likelihood that a firm will be hit with a civil sanction. Thus, a firm
subject to sanctions necessarily reduces its expected penalty costs when
it adopts prevention measures. When firms operate in competitive mar-
kets, with prices that adjust freely to reflect actual product costs, federal
authorities can use the threat of corporate liability to induce firms to
invest optimally in prevention. Federal authorities can achieve this goal
by using respondeat superior to hold firms strictly liable for all
employee crimes committed in the scope of employment to benefit the
firm. This liability will induce optimal prevention so long as the firm's
expected liability equals the full social cost of the crime (that the firm
does not otherwise bear). This liability can be civil.42
By contrast, federal authorities cannot use strict respondeat superior
liability to induce firms to adopt optimal policing measures, such as
monitoring to detect wrongdoing, self-reporting, and cooperation. Polic-
ing measures have two potentially competing effects on a firm. On the
one hand, these measures benefit the firm by deterring wrongdoing
because corporate policing increases the expected cost to individual vio-
lators by increasing the probability that the violation is detected and
sanctioned. This deterrent effect of policing confers a benefit on firms
that is positively related to the firm's expected liability if the violation
occurs. On the other hand, policing measures are potentially costly for
the firm. The cost of these measures goes beyond the direct costs of
implementing them, and includes any increase in the firm's expected
liability as a result of adopting policing measures. Policing measures
supra note 1, at 31 (explaining why the government cannot use individual liability to provide
firms with optimal incentives to undertake prevention and policing); id. at 51 (explaining why
firms will not police optimally even when they are subject to an expected market sanction for
detected wrongdoing equal to the social cost of the crime).
42. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 727; see Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra
note 1, at 13-24 (discussing how and when the optimal sanction must be adjusted to reflect the
fact that government and corporate enforcement is a social cost of crime). Cf. Michael K. Block,
Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395,
397 (1991) (determining the optimal sanction when government enforcement is costly); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pun.
ECON. 89 (1984) (determining the optimal sanction for purely individual crimes when government
enforcement is costly).
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have the potential to increase the firm's expected liability costs because
policing increases the likelihood that federal authorities can detect a
wrong and obtain the evidence needed to bring a successful action for
the violation. To the extent the actions are brought against individual
violators, policing simply produces a deterrent effect. But to the extent
federal authorities also sanction the firm, then the firm's investment in
detection, self-reporting, and cooperation may increase the firm's own
expected liability.43 This liability enhancement effect has the potential to
undermine (or eliminate) firms' incentives to detect, self-report, and
monitor. Accordingly, to induce firms to optimally monitor, self-report,
and cooperate, federal authorities need to structure the penalty regime to
ensure that firms always face lower expected costs when they invest
optimally in detection, self-reporting, and cooperation, than when they
fail to do so."
The next section discusses how federal authorities should structure
penalties to achieve these aims and explains why the Organizational
Guidelines do not achieve these goals. Section Three discusses changes
to the Guidelines that would better enable the Guidelines to induce firms
to intervene to deter corporate crime, which are consistent with the
enforcement policy adopted by the Department of Justice.
2. MITIGATION PROVISIONS FOR COMPLIANCE, SELF-REPORTING,
AND COOPERATION
This section assesses the mitigation provisions of the Organiza-
tional Guidelines to determine whether they are structured to achieve the
central goal of corporate liability, which is to deter corporate crime. As
previously explained, as applied to crimes involving larger firms, corpo-
rate criminal sanctions will not deter corporate crime effectively unless
they induce corporate policing: specifically, monitoring, self-reporting,
and cooperation. Accordingly, this section focuses on whether the Orga-
nizational Guidelines employ a penalty structure that encourages corpo-
rate policing. As explained in this section, in order to induce corporate
policing the state must employ a duty-based corporate liability regime,
under which a firm faces a much smaller sanction (or even no criminal
43. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 42 n.89; Arlen & Kraakman,
supra note 3, at 708. Although little empirical analysis exists on the degree to which corporate
policing increases a firm's probability of being criminally sanctioned, a recent empirical analysis
of firms' self-reporting of restatements to the Securities and Exchange Commission finds that self-
reporting significantly increases the probability that the firm is sanctioned. Rebecca Files, SEC
Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter?, J. Accr. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftin?abstract id=1640064.
44. Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1, at 849; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note
3, at 692-93.
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sanction) if it engages in optimal monitoring, self-reporting, or coopera-
tion." This section shows that, consistent with optimal deterrence, the
Organizational Guidelines provide that convicted firms should be sub-
ject to a lower criminal fine if the firm adopted an effective compliance
program, self-reported the wrong, or cooperated, in some circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Organizational Guidelines are ineffective because the
amount of mitigation is insufficient to truly encourage corporate polic-
ing, especially when the firm is large or corporate policing is particularly
effective.46
A. Structuring Penalties to Encourage Detection, Reporting,
and Cooperation
The most effective way to induce corporations to take the actions
that government authorities want them to take is to structure sanctions to
ensure that firms that take the desired actions are better off than those
which do not. This implies that the government must structure corporate
civil and criminal liability to ensure that firms that detect, report, and
cooperate face lower expected costs than those who do not. Thus, the
Guidelines must ensure that each firm that implements an effective pro-
gram to detect wrongdoing, or reports, or cooperates, gets the benefit of
a reduction in its expected liability that equals or exceeds the expected
cost to the firm of compliance, reporting, or cooperation, respectively."
Given that policing imposes direct costs on the firm, we know that the
government cannot induce effective policing unless the firm's total
expected penalties-if it engages in optimal policing-are lower than if
it does not. This presents a challenge for corporate liability because
policing increases the probability that the firm is sanctioned for any and
all crimes that are not deterred. Accordingly, in order to ensure that
firms benefit from policing, the government generally must substantially
reduce the actual penalty imposed on firms for those crimes that are
detected if the firm policed optimally.
This implies that the Guidelines cannot reliably induce corporate
45. Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects, supra note 1, at 866-67; Arlen & Kraakman, supra
note 3, at 710.
46. The deficiencies in the Organizational Guidelines may result, in part, from the fact that
the Sentencing Commission did not fully embrace a deterrence-oriented approach to corporate
crime--even with respect to publicly-held firms (whose shareholders are not complicit in the
crime)-but instead formally embraced many goals. This undermined the Guidelines'
effectiveness at achieving one of the most important goals of corporate criminal liability-
deterring corporate crime.
47. A firm's expected liability costs equal the number of violations expected when the firm
has a compliance program, multiplied by both the probability that the government detects and
sanctions the violation (when the firm has a compliance program) and the sanction imposed when
there is a compliance program.
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policing unless they grant sufficient mitigation to counteract the fact that
policing increases the probability the firm is sanctioned. Thus, in order
to ensure that a firm's total expected liability-as given by the
probability of sanction multiplied by the penalty-is lower if it engages
in optimal policing than if it does not, the Organizational Guidelines
often must ensure sufficient penalty mitigation to counteract the increase
in the probability of detection produced by corporate policing.4 8
To illustrate, consider the case of reporting and cooperation. A firm
that reports detected wrongdoing and cooperates with the government's
investigation generally guarantees that federal enforcement authorities
will be able to sanction it for violations that otherwise might have gone
undetected and unsanctioned. In other words, the firm often increases its
probability of being sanctioned from P<1 to Prepo,,=1. Accordingly, in
order to encourage reporting and cooperation, the Sentencing Commis-
sion must structure penalties so that the penalty imposed on the firm if it
does report and cooperate is lower than the expected penalty imposed on
a firm that does not report and cooperate-where the expected penalty
imposed for failure to report is the actual penalty multiplied by the
probability that the government can detect and sanction the wrong if the
firm does not self-report and cooperate (PF). When reporting and coop-
eration significantly improve the enforcement staff's effectiveness, the
amount of mitigation must at least counteract the increase in the
probability of sanction produced by the firm's policing activities."9
To see this, consider a firm that has detected a violation and must
decide whether to report and cooperate. Assume that if the firm does not
report and cooperate, the government may not ever learn of the crime.
By contrast, if it reports and cooperates, the government definitely will
be able to sanction the firm for the violation. Specifically, assume that if
the firm does not report and cooperate, the probability is only 20% that
the government can detect and sanction the firm on its own." If the firm
does report and cooperate, the government certainly can sanction the
48. The precise condition depends on the deterrent effect of corporate policing, which
provides an additional benefit to firms that police effectively. Where the deterrent effect is
uncertain, federal authorities cannot reliably induce corporate policing unless they structure
liability to eliminate the liability enhancement effect of corporate policing. See Arlen &
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 721-23 (discussing optimal duty-based mitigation); Arlen, Corporate
Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 31-36 (same); see also Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects,
supra note 1, at 842-43 (showing that duty-based corporate liability can be used to induce optimal
corporate monitoring); John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation, and the FERC,
29 ENERGY L.J. 547, 569 (2008) (arguing that firms that satisfy all three policing duties should
receive "significant" mitigation of the penalty imposed for serious violations).
49. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 750-51.
50. There is limited empirical evidence on the probability that wrongs are detected, but the
limited evidence available suggests that the government does not detect many crimes on its own.
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65
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firm. In this situation, a firm that reports and cooperates faces an
expected sanction equal to the mitigated penalty:
PenaltyMitgated
By contrast, a firm that does not report faces a low probability (20%) of
having to pay higher unmitigated sanction. This results in an expected
penalty of .20 multiplied by PenaltyUnmitigated:
.2 (PenaltyUnmitigated)
In order to create an incentive to report, the Guidelines must ensure that
the expected (i.e., probability-adjusted) penalty imposed on firms that
report and cooperate is less than the expected (probability-adjusted) pen-
alty imposed on firms that do not. In this example, the Guidelines must
ensure that the mitigated penalty is less than or equal to one-fifth of the
unmitigated penalty:
PenaltyMiigated < .2(PenaltyUnmitigated)
If the amount of penalty mitigation is less than this, the firm is better off
if it does not report or cooperate.
Similar analysis can be used to show that the Guidelines cannot be
relied on to encourage compliance unless the degree of penalty mitiga-
tion accorded to firms that adopt effective compliance programs is suffi-
ciently great to ensure that firms are better off adopting effective
compliance programs. This implies that the amount of mitigation should
reflect the increase in the probability of detection that results when a
firm adopts an effective compliance program."
J. FIN. 2213, 2251 (2010). Moreover, even if the government does detect the crime, it often needs
corporate assistance to obtain the evidence needed to convict individual wrongdoers.
51. The precise conditions for optimal mitigation can be found in Arlen, Corporate Criminal
Liability, supra note 1, at 59, and Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 755. Optimal mitigation for
compliance program adoption differs from optimal mitigation for self-reporting because firms
adopting an effective compliance program not only suffer a liability enhancement penalty but also
may derive a deterrence benefit at the moment they make the investment decision (assuming the
program reduces the expected number of violations). Nevertheless, if firms cannot quantify the
deterrence benefit, and thus are likely to discount it in determining the costs and benefits of
compliance, then mitigation will not reliably encourage effective compliance unless mitigation
fully counteracts the increase in the probability of sanction resulting from the firm's adoption of
an effective compliance program.
Mitigation for compliance programs also raises special problems because it is difficult to
determine whether a firm with detected wrongdoing nevertheless had a genuinely effective
compliance program (and commitment to on-going compliance monitoring) or merely cosmetic
compliance. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. REv. 487 (2003). Prosecutors and judges must make sure
not to grant credit for purely cosmetic compliance. Moreover, additional concerns arise that, even
with adequate credit, publicly-held firms may not adopt effective compliance programs because of
agency costs. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 19. Agency costs may result in firms failing to adopt
truly effective compliance programs even when the government provides optimal incentives.
Agency costs may be particularly strong with respect to compliance because shareholders cannot
easily monitor whether managers are actively overseeing compliance. For this reason, in some
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B. Deficiencies with Guidelines' Provisions Governing Mitigation
The Sentencing Commission recognized the central importance of
corporate policing in structuring the Organizational Guidelines. The
Organizational Guidelines thus provide that firms that adopt effective
compliance programs, self-report, and cooperate should face a lower
criminal fine than those that did not engage in optimal policing, under
some circumstances. Nevertheless, the Sentencing Commission failed to
achieve the core deterrence goal of corporate liability--inducing firms
to detect, self-report, and cooperate--because the Commission adopted
mitigation provisions that are too narrow in scope and too small in mag-
nitude to genuinely encourage effective efforts to detect wrongdoing,
self-report it, or fully cooperate. The deficiencies are particularly great
for the provisions governing the fines imposed on large firms for wrongs
by higher level or multiple supervisory personnel. The adverse conse-
quences of this failure have been significant: in many circumstances, the
Guidelines discourage firms from adopting effective compliance pro-
grams, self-reporting, and cooperating by imposing higher expected pen-
alties on those that do.52 While the DOJ has reduced the problem in
some circumstances through its corporate non-prosecution policy (dis-
cussed below), the perverse incentives that the Guidelines create still
operate for firms that are not confident of getting the benefit of this DOJ
policy.
This part details the deficiencies with the Guidelines' provisions
governing mitigation for firms that adopt compliance programs, self-
report, and cooperate. The Guidelines are plagued with two problems.
First, they excessively restrict the circumstances under which firms are
eligible for mitigation. Second, firms-especially large firms-that are
eligible for mitigation obtain too little mitigation to encourage active
efforts to detect, report, and cooperate.
circumstances it may be optimal to supplement duty-based sanctions with mandates requiring the
firm to adopt an effective compliance program. It also may be optimal to supplement this mandate
with a mandate requiring the firm to accept a corporate monitor. Id. For a discussion of problems
with the existing DOJ approach to prosecutor-imposed structural reforms, see, e.g., id.; Arlen,
supra note 21; Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 19; Khanna & Dickinson, supra
note 19.
52. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 745-49 (showing that the Sentencing Guidelines will
not induce firms to invest in detection, self-reporting, and to cooperate). The degree to which
corporate criminal liability with inadequate mitigation reduces firms' incentives to police depends
in large part on the effect of corporate policing on firms' probability of detection and sanction.
Firms threatened with liability (with inadequate mitigation) may be deterred from corporate
policing unless the government will be able to detect and sanction any crimes their employees
commit even if the firm does not engage in effective policing.
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1. STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Guidelines' mitigation
provisions, we must first set forth the factors that determine the corpo-
rate criminal fine under the Guidelines.53 The Organizational Guidelines
provide that the judge should impose a criminal fine on the firm that
falls within the "minimum of the guideline fine range" and the "maxi-
mum of the guidelines fine range," except in exceptional situations. The
minimum and maximum fines are determined by multiplying the "base
fine" associated with the offense by the minimum and maximum fine
"multipliers," respectively.54
The Organizational Guidelines provide that the base fine is the
greatest of (1) an amount set forth in the Offense Level Table; (2) the
pecuniary gain to the firm from the crime; or (3) the pecuniary loss from
the offense, to the extent that the loss was caused intentionally, know-
ingly, or recklessly (by the employee committing the offense)."5 This
base fine is then multiplied by the minimum and maximum multipliers
to determine the fine range.
The minimum and maximum multipliers are obtained by calculat-
ing the firm's "culpability score." The culpability score is based on a set
of factors that go beyond corporate culpability in the sense of corporate
shareholder culpability. Instead, culpability is based largely on whether
senior management is complicit in the crime or alternatively is attempt-
ing to deter corporate wrongdoing by undertaking effective corporate
policing. Specifically, in determining the culpability score, each firm
starts with five points. Points are then added to the culpability score if
crime was committed or condoned by anyone within the high-level per-
sonnel of the firm or a unit of the firm (if the unit is large), or if toler-
ance of the offense by substantial authority personnel was pervasive
throughout the firm or unit. The number of points added in this situation
ranges from one to five depending on the size of the firm. Firms with
5,000 employees or more have five points added to their culpability
score in this situation." Points also are added if the firm has a prior
history of the offense, violated an order in committing the offense, or
53. This section only discusses the provisions governing the criminal fines. In addition to
criminal fines, the Guidelines also impose other penalties on firms convicted of corporate crimes,
including disgorgement (criminal restitution), remedial orders, and corporate probation. The
corporate probation can include nonmonetary sanctions, such as a requirement to adopt an
effective compliance program. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, ch. 8; see also Arlen, Corporate
Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 6-8 (discussing the structure of the Guidelines and providing
evidence on the magnitude of corporate criminal fines and total criminal sanctions).
54. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C2.7.
55. Id. at § 8C2.4.
56. Id. § 8C2.5(a)-(b).
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obstructed justice."
It is worth noting that for most important crimes, firms with more
than 200 employees can expect to start with a culpability score of at
least eight. This is because firms with 200 or more employees have three
to five points added to the base score of five if high-level personnel
committed the crime or tolerance of the crime by supervisory personnel
was pervasive5 8 and high-level personnel is broadly defined. It includes
anyone who sets "policy" for or "controls" either the firm or the unit
affected by the crime (if the unit had 200 or more employees). Supervi-
sory personnel is defined even more broadly. When one considers
crimes such as securities fraud, health care fraud, and money laundering,
most of these crimes require (or involve) the participation of someone
with a considerable degree of authority who can speak for the firm.
Thus, many important crimes are likely to trigger the culpability score
enhancements that push the unmitigated culpability score over eight.
Firms can obtain a reduction in their culpability score if they adopt
an effective compliance program, self-report detected wrongdoing
promptly, fully cooperate with the government's investigation, and/or
accept responsibility, at least in some circumstances. A firm that satis-
fies all of the policing duties imposed by the Guidelines can obtain an
eight point reduction in its culpability score. Thus, a large firm (5,000 or
more employees) that starts with a culpability score of ten as a result of
managerial complicity in the crime can use policing to get its culpability
score reduced to two. A firm that starts with a culpability score of five
ends up with an effective score of zero. Firms that adopted an effective
compliance program prior to the violation being detected can get a three-
point reduction in the culpability score, provided that they satisfy the
other requirements needed to obtain mitigation for monitoring. Firms
that self-report promptly, fully cooperate, and accept responsibility are
eligible for a five point reduction, if they satisfy the other requirements
for mitigation. Firms that only fully cooperate and accept responsibility
get a two point reduction in the culpability score.59
The culpability score is important because it determines the mini-
mum and maximum fine multiplier (which is multiplied by the base fine
to determine the range of fines to be imposed on the firm). Firms with a
culpability score of 10 or more are subject to a fine that is two to four
times their base fine (and then other sanctions may be imposed as well).
Firms with a culpability score of five are subject to a minimum multi-
plier of one and a maximum multiplier of two. Firms with a culpability
57. Id. § 8C2.5(c)-(e).
58. Id. § 8C2.5(b)(3).
59. Id. § 8C2.5(b), (f)-(g).
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score of zero or less are subject to a minimum multiplier of .05 and a
maximum multiplier of .2, implying that, under the Guidelines, each
firm faces a criminal fine even if it faithfully satisfies every policing
duty.6 o
There is no doubt that the Organizational Guidelines would help
deter crime if the mitigation provisions provided sufficient fine mitiga-
tion to induce firms to police optimally. The problem is that the Guide-
lines adopted by the Sentencing Commission fail to provide adequate
incentives to self-report, cooperate, or adopt an effective compliance
program. To show this, we consider each of these in turn. We begin with
self-reporting and cooperation because the government can best achieve
its primary goal-imposing optimal sanctions on the individuals respon-
sible for the crime-if it is able to induce firms (and particularly large
firms) to self-report detected wrongdoing and cooperate with the gov-
ernment's enforcement efforts.
2. MITIGATION PROVISIONs GOVERNING SELF-REPORTING
AND COOPERATION
The Sentencing Commission made three mistakes in structuring the
provisions governing fine mitigation for reporting and cooperation.
First, the Commission excessively restricted the scope of mitigation by
attaching too many conditions on the firm's right to obtain mitigation.
Second, the Commission did not grant a sufficient amount of mitigation
to induce firms to self-report and cooperate. The problem is particularly
pronounced in the case of ex post cooperation, which generally is vitally
important to the government. Finally, the Commission incorrectly struc-
tured the Guidelines so that larger firms obtain a lower percentage
reduction in their expected fine (all else equal) than small ones, even
though the government is more likely to benefit from mitigation when
the firm is large (and in turn, the firm is more likely to increase its own
expected probability of sanction if it is large than if it is small) because
cooperation by large firms is often more valuable.
a. Restrictions on the Scope of Mitigation
Consider first the Guidelines' provisions governing mitigation for
self-reporting. Firms are entitled to five points of mitigation for self-
reporting a crime to the government but only if several conditions are
met. The most important restriction for our purposes is the requirement
that the firm "accept[ ] responsibility for its criminal conduct" in order
to obtain mitigation for self-reporting.6 1 This condition is counter-
60. Id. § 8C2.6.
61. Id. § 8C2.5(g). In addition, the firm must self-report prior to imminent threat of disclosure
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productive because firms cannot be confident that they will be deemed
to have accepted responsibility unless they plead guilty. 62 Given this, the
Guidelines do not provide strong incentives for firms to report detected
suspicious activities unless the firm is prepared to plead guilty. The firm
might well not want to plead guilty for legitimate reasons, such as where
the firm believes that its activities did not violate the law. While the
Guidelines provide that a firm may get credit in such circumstances, the
commentary states that this is a rare circumstance, which correctly
leaves firms concerned that they will not be able to obtain credit for self-
reporting should the firm decide to fight the criminal charges.
b. Inadequate Amount of Mitigation
Moreover, and more importantly, the amount of mitigation pro-
vided to firms that self-report, cooperate, and accept responsibility is too
small to induce firms to undertake these activities, especially when they
are most valuable. Moreover, the problem of inadequate mitigation is
most pronounced for large firms.
. A firm that self-reports wrongdoing prior to the imminent threat of
disclosure, fully cooperates, and accepts responsibility often can expect
to dramatically increase the probability that the wrong is detected and
that the firm is sanctioned. Indeed, in the case of wrongs that can remain
hidden indefinitely (which includes most frauds), it is likely that corpo-
rate self-reporting of previously undetected wrongs more than triples the
probability that the government detects the wrong and sanctions the
firm.6 3 Moreover, in order to get credit for self-reporting, firms generally
need to guarantee their own conviction by fully cooperating and
accepting responsibility. Thus, the activities the firm needs to do to get
credit for self-reporting often combine to guarantee that the firm will be
penalized for violations that otherwise likely would have remained
undetected and/or unsanctioned.64
Accordingly, in order to ensure that firms want to self-report, fully
cooperate, and settle, the Organizational Guidelines must ensure that the
firm's expected (probability-adjusted) liability is lower if the firm
engages in these activities than if it does not. This implies that a firm
or government investigation. The firm must have reported within a "reasonably prompt time" after
becoming aware of the offense (which includes time to conduct an internal investigation). Id.
62. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 14.
63. Indeed, in the case of financial wrongs, including frauds, this likely is a generous
assessment, because the government appears to detect far less than one-third of the crimes
committed. Indeed, if senior executives and middle managers of publicly-held firms were to face a
probability of detection of 33%, it is likely that few would commit corporate crimes, given that
they generally could lead very comfortable lives without doing so.
64. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 708-09.
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that self-reports and fully cooperates must receive sufficient mitigation
to fully counteract the effect of these activities on the probability of
sanction.6 5 In other words, it must be the case that:
FineMitigated < P(FineUnmitigated)
where P is the probability that the government can detect and sanction
the crime if the firm does not self-report and cooperate. In the case of a
firm that detects a wrong that the government is unlikely to detect (say
only 1/3 likely to detect), this implies that the mitigated fine cannot
exceed 1/3 of the unmitigated fine, or else the firm is better off keeping
quiet and hoping that the government does not detect the crime. Thus,
reporting and cooperation must reduce the fine by more than 65%.
If we examine the amount of mitigation granted for these activities
under the Guidelines, we see that it often fails to provide sufficient miti-
gation to self-report and fully cooperate in any situation where these
activities confer a material benefit on the enforcement staff. In particu-
lar, many firms only get a fine reduction of 10-50%, leaving firms bear-
ing 50-90% of the unmitigated fine even if they reported and cooperated
(Table One). This is not sufficient to induce self-reporting when self-
reporting more than doubles the government's ability to detect and sanc-
tion the wrong. Thus, the amount of mitigation offered to many firms is
not sufficient to encourage self-reporting and full cooperation in any sit-
uation where prosecutors would genuinely benefit from these activities.
Moreover, the structure of the Guidelines' mitigation provisions is
perverse because the Guidelines grant a lower percentage reduction to
firms with higher initial culpability scores, for example, large firms with
culpable managers. Thus, rather than providing strong incentives to self-
report to large firms detecting a violation involving high-level personnel,
the Sentencing Commission structured the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines to create quite low incentives for these firms to self-report.66
This structure is perverse because the enforcement staff is likely to
derive the most benefit from self-reporting, full cooperation, and settle-
ment when violations involve large firms, as these violations can be the
hardest to detect and investigate and also are likely to cause the largest
harm if they remain unreported.
To see the problem, examine Table One. Consider a large firm
(5,000 employees) that has detected a violation involving high-level per-
sonnel. This firm would face an unmitigated culpability score of ten (if
65. See id. at 764.
66. A firm that faces an unmitigated culpability score of five obtains a culpability score of
one if it self-reports, fully cooperates, and settles. This lowers the fine multiplier from one to two
times the base fine to 0.2-0.4 times the base fine, which is 20% of the unmitigated sanction.
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there were no other basis for aggravation). 67 Assume further that the
firm has a prior history of the offense in the last five years. This firm
now faces an unmitigated culpability score of twelve. Should this firm
detect a wrong, it would face a fine of two-four times the base fine if it
does not self-report, cooperate, and accept responsibility. If the firm
does self-report, cooperate, and accept responsibility, it would get five
points of mitigation and face a fine of 1.4-2.8 times the base fine. Thus,
the firm is left subject to a sanction that is 70% of the unmitigated fine if
it self-reports, cooperates, and accepts responsibility. This is not enough
mitigation to induce self-reporting of violations where the probability
that the enforcement staff will be able to detect the violation and sanc-
tion the firm on its own is less than 70%. By contrast, a firm that starts
with a culpability score of five can get a 95% reduction in its fine by
self-reporting, cooperating, and accepting responsibility. The decision to
impose a higher fine on the shareholders of a large publicly-held firm
that self-reports and cooperates than on the shareholders of a smaller
firm is inconsistent with optimal deterrence. Indeed, corporate self-
reporting is most needed when senior managers of large firms commit a
crime, as they have the greatest capacity to cause serious harm and often
are better able to avoid detection or sanction absent full corporate coop-
eration. Thus, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines fails to ade-
quately reward self-reporting and full cooperation where they are most
needed.
Further analysis reveals that the preceding discussion understates
the potentially perverse disincentive not to report that the Guidelines
produce. Although the Guidelines provide that a firm can get a five point
reduction in the culpability score if it self-reports, the marginal benefit to
a firm of self-reporting often is far less than this. This is so for two
reasons. First, a firm only gets five points of mitigation for self-reporting
the crime if it also cooperates and accepts responsibility. Yet a firm that
plans to cooperate and accept responsibility is eligible for a two point
reduction in its culpability score for those acts alone. This implies that
the marginal benefit to a firm of self-reporting is only a three point
reduction in its culpability score, since it could get a two point reduction
by just cooperating and accepting responsibility should the government
detect the wrong.6 8 Viewed from this perspective, we see that the Orga-
nizational Guidelines provide truly anemic levels of mitigation to firms
that self-report.
Accordingly, a large firm (5,000 employees or more) that reports a
crime involving high level personnel can expect no more than a 30%
67. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(a)-(b).
68. This discussion assumes that the firm does not have an effective compliance program.
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TABLE ONE
EFFECT OF SELF-REPORTING, COOPERATING AND ACCEPTING
RESPONSIBILITY (5 PT)
Culability Unmitigated Mitigated Mitigated Mitigated Reduction 
Reduction
cpat Multiplier Culpability Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Score (Min-Max) Score Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier
14 2.00-4.00 9 1.80 3.60 10% 10%
13 2.00-4.00 8 1.60 3.20 20% 20%
12 2.00-4.00 7 1.40 2.80 30% 30%
11 2.00-4.00 6 1.20 2.40 40% 40%
10 2.00-4.00 5 1.00 2.00 50% 50%
9 1.80-3.60 4 0.80 1.60 56% 56%
8 1.60-3.20 3 0.60 1.20 63% 63%
7 1.40-2.80 2 0.40 0.80 71% 71%
6 1.20-2.40 1 0.20 0.40 83% 83%
5 1.00-2.00 0 0.05 0.20 95% 90%
4 0.80-1.60 -1 0.05 0.20 94% 88%
3 0.60-1.20 -2 0.05 0.20 92% 83%
2 0.40-0.80 -3 0.05 0.20 88% 75%
1 0.20-0.40 -4 0.05 0.20 75% 50%
0 0.05-0.20 -5 0.05 0.20 0% 0%
reduction in its fine. This implies that the firm still expects to pay 70%
of the fine if it does report (assuming it does not cooperate). Letting F be
the unmitigated base fine, this means that a large firm faces expected
costs of
(Probability Government Detects Crime on its Own)F
and expected sanctions of the following if it does report, where we rec-
ognize that if the firm reports but does not cooperate there is a (small)
chance it can avoid sanction:
(Probability of Government Sanction if no cooperation)(.7)F
As long as the difference between the probability that the govern-
ment sanctions if the firm reports and the probability that the govern-
ment detects the crime on its own is more than 30%, then the firm can
only hurt itself by reporting. Indeed, if we assume that the government
has an 80% chance of convicting a firm that self-reports a crime assum-
ing it does not cooperate (which is likely an underestimate if the
employees actually committed a crime), then the firm faces a choice
between an expected sanction of (.8)(.7)F = .56F if it does report and an
expected fine of PF, if it does not report, where P is the probability that
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the government is able to detect the wrong and sanction the firm if the
firm does not report and cooperate. In this case, a firm only increases its
expected cost if it self-reports, unless (as is unlikely) it expects that if it
does not self-report there is at least a 56% chance that the government
will detect the crime and convict the firm. There is little, if any, evidence
to suggest that the government is even remotely that effective at
detecting and convicting crimes by large firms absent corporate assis-
tance. Thus, a firm facing the penalty regime created by the Guidelines
is far better off ignoring evidence of potential crimes in the hope that the
government will not detect it (and safe in the knowledge that if the gov-
ernment does detect it the firm can get at least two points of mitigation
by cooperating and accepting responsibility).
TABLE Two
MARGINAL BENEFIT OF SELF-REPORTING (3 r)
Unmitigated Mitigated Mitigated Mitigated Reduction Reduction
Scui Multiplier Culpability Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Score (Min-Max) Score Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier
14 2.00-4.00 11 2.00 4.00 0% 0%
13 2.00-4.00 10 2.00 4.00 0% 0%
12 2.00-4.00 9 1.80 3.60 10% 10%
11 2.00-4.00 8 1.60 3.20 20% 20%
10 2.00-4.00 7 1.40 2.80 30% 30%
9 1.80-3.60 6 1.20 2.40 33% 33%
8 1.60-3.20 5 1.00 2.00 38% 38%
7 1.40-2.80 4 0.80 1.60 43% 43%
6 1.20-2.40 3 0.60 1.20 50% 50%
5 1.00-2.00 2 0.40 0.80 60% 60%
4 0.80-1.60 1 0.20 0.40 75% 75%
3 0.60-1.20 0 0.05 0.20 92% 83%
2 0.40-0.80 -1 0.05 0.20 88% 75%
1 0.20-0.40 -2 0.05 0.20 75% 50%
0 0.05-0.20 -3 0.05 0.20 0% 0%
Examining Table Two, we see that, once we take this consideration
into account, the Organizational Guidelines do little to encourage report-
ing by any firm with a culpability score over five-which means that
larger firms generally get little credit for reporting crimes such as fraud.
As previously discussed, firms with more than 200 employees can
expect to have a culpability score of at least eight for most crimes, such
as health care fraud, securities fraud, and false claims, that tend to
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involve the participation of either high level personnel of the unit (or the
firm) or multiple supervisory personnel. This implies that firms with 200
or more employees regularly start with an unmitigated culpability score
of at least eight. None of these firms can obtain even a 40% reduction in
their fine if they report. Thus, as long as the government has less than a
60% chance of detecting the crime on its own, these firms fare better if
they do not report. Indeed, we see that the Guidelines deter self-report-
ing when it is most needed-when the government would be unlikely to
detect the crime on its own but could obtain the evidence needed to
sanction wrongdoers if the firm does report.69
Beyond this, the Sentencing Commission gives firms that did not
self-detect the wrong (and thus did not self-report it) far too little incen-
tive to cooperate and accept responsibility. The problem, once again, is
particularly severe in the case of large firms. Firms that cooperate and
accept responsibility, in effect, end up guaranteeing their own conviction
69. This analysis of the marginal benefit of reporting understates the marginal benefit of
reporting to some firms: those firms eligible for mitigation based on their adoption of an effective
compliance program. The marginal benefit of reporting a detected wrong for a firm with an
effective compliance program is higher than three because a firm with an effective compliance
program is potentially eligible for a three-point reduction in its culpability score, but only if it self-
reports any detected wrongs. Consequently, for these firms the marginal benefit of self-reporting
is the six-point reduction in the culpability score the firm gets for both the effective compliance
program and for self-reporting (recognizing that it only gets the credit for self-reporting if it plans
to cooperate and accept responsibility, in which case it will get an additional two points of
mitigation).
Nevertheless, the conclusion remains that the Guidelines' penalty regime does not provide
larger firms with sufficient incentive to self-report detected wrongdoing if high-level personnel or
supervisory-authority personnel were involved in or condoned the crime. Specifically, the
Guidelines provide substantial mitigation to smaller firms but much less to firms with 1,000
employees or more (and managerial involvement). This pattern is perverse because compliance
programs are far more important for larger firms than small ones. Managers of small firms can
more easily obtain good information about the firm's operations and risks during the course of
normal operations. By contrast, directors and managers of large firms need the information and
oversight that a good compliance program can provide. Moreover, the government is likely to get
greater marginal benefit from the combined effect of an effective corporate compliance program
and self-reporting when a firm is large than when it is small. This is because larger firms'
operations are more complex, and thus larger firms may be better able to hide crimes such as
fraud. Thus, the government often will have a harder time detecting the crime if the larger firms
do not self-report and may have an equally hard time convicting wrongdoers without the evidence
that a good compliance program provides.
Moreover, not only has the Sentencing Commission provided small firms with larger
incentives to adopt an effective compliance program and self-report than larger firms, but the
magnitude of the benefit provided to larger firms is not enough to induce firms to adopt an
effective compliance program and self-report, except in those circumstances where the combined
effect of an effective compliance program and self-reporting has relatively little marginal effect on
the probability of detection and sanction. This condition holds only if the government is very
likely to detect and sanction the crime even if the firm does not have an effective compliance
program and self-reports or if the firm is very likely to escape sanction even if it reports and
cooperates. For most crimes, these conditions are unlikely to arise.
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most of the time. Yet the Sentencing Commission structured the Guide-
lines so that a large firm with at least 5,000 employees (and complicit
higher-level personnel) receives only a 20% reduction in its expected
fine in return for its cooperation if they did not self-report the wrong,
even if the firm's cooperation enables the government to obtain convic-
tions (of the firm and the responsible individuals) that it likely could not
otherwise obtain. To see this, consider Table Three. A firm with at least
1,000 employees only receives a 22% reduction in its expected fine for
cooperation (if it did not self-report). This is reasonable if corporate
cooperation has little effect on the government's ability to sanction the
firm and the responsible individuals. Yet often this is not the case.
Indeed, as we shall see in Section Three, the DOJ has concluded that in
many cases (especially those involving large firms) corporate coopera-
tion is vitally important. If this cooperation increases the probability of
sanction by even 25%, firms subject to the Guidelines will be loath to
provide it.70
Moreover, the deficiencies of the Organizational Guidelines are
more apparent once we recognize that the firms obtain a lower percent-
age reduction in their expected sanction than the mitigation provisions
appear to grant. The mitigation provisions generally only relate to the
criminal fine. Yet firms convicted of a corporate crime often are subject
to criminal restitution and/or remedial orders in addition to the fine.
Where the base fine equals the harm caused or gain to the firm, these
"non-fine" sanctions can, in effect, increase the multiplier by one, so that
a firm paying a criminal fine of two to four times the base fine can
expect a total penalty of three to five times the base fine once criminal
restitution or remedial orders are taken into account.7 2 Given this, we see
that the benefit of self-reporting, cooperating, and accepting responsibil-
ity is far less than it first appeared, because these activities reduce the
criminal fine but do not necessarily affect criminal restitution or
remediation penalties. Accordingly, if we look at the effect of self-
reporting, cooperating, and accepting responsibility on the total expected
criminal penalty, we see that firms rarely can expect as much as a 50%
reduction in their expected criminal penalty if remediation/restitution
payments only equal the base fine. The problem is pronounced for firms
70. The Guidelines allow judges to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines if the government
files a motion saying that the firm has provided substantial assistance in the investigation.
ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C4. 1. Nevertheless, the amount of mitigation encouraged by the
Guidelines themselves generally is inadequate to induce cooperation, especially by larger firms
with respect to crimes involving managers.
71. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8B 1.1 -3.
72. This effect is muted to the extent that the firm also is subject to a government-imposed
civil penalty that is reduced by the amount of restitution or to the extent that restitution reduces
private civil liability.
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TABLE THREE
EFFECT OF COOPERATING AND ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY
(2 PT)
Culpability Unmitigated Mitigated Mitigated Mitigated Reduction Reduction
Score Multiplier Culpability Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
(Min-Max) Score Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier
14 2.00-4.00 12 2.00 4.00 0% 0%
13 2.00-4.00 11 2.00 4.00 0% 0%
12 2.00-4.00 10 2.00 4.00 0% 0%
11 2.00-4.00 9 1.80 3.60 10% 10%
10 2.00-4.00 8 1.60 3.20 20% 20%
9 1.80-3.60 7 1.40 2.80 22% 22%
8 1.60-3.20 6 1.20 2.40 25% 25%
7 1.40-2.80 5 1.00 2.00 29% 29%
6 1.20-2.40 4 0.80 1.60 33% 33%
5 1.00-2.00 3 0.60 1.20 40% 40%
4 0.80-1.60 2 0.40 0.80 50% 50%
3 0.60-1.20 1 0.20 0.40 67% 67%
2 0.40-0.80 0 0.05 0.20 88% 75%
1 0.20-0.40 -1 0.05 0.20 75% 50%
0 0.05-0.20 -2 0.05 0.20 0% 0%
whose unmitigated culpability score exceeds six-which is to say firms
(with greater than 200 employees) whose managers were complicit in
the crime. Such firms would be better off not self-reporting detected
crimes if they expect to fall under the Guidelines and if there is less than
a 50% chance that the government will detect the wrong if the firm does
not report it.73
3. MITIGATION PROVISIONS GOVERNING EFFECTIVE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
The Sentencing Commission also needed to structure the mitigation
provisions to encourage firms to adopt an effective compliance program.
Yet the Organizational Guidelines it adopted do not provide adequate
incentives to adopt compliance programs that materially enhance the
probability that crimes are detected.
The Organizational Guidelines need to provide substantial mitiga-
73. But see supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that the marginal benefit of self-
reporting is higher if the firm can be confident of getting credit for having an effective compliance
program if it self-reports the wrong).
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TABLE FOUR
EFFECT OF SELF-REPORTING, COOPERATING
RESPONSIBILITY (5 PT)
AND ACCEPTING
Unmitigated Mitigated Reduction Reduction
Culpability Mitigated
Score Multiplier Culpability Mul Minimum Maximum
(Min-Max) Score Multiplier Multiplier
14 3.00-5.00 9 2.80-4.60 7% 8%
13 3.00-5.00 8 2.60-4.20 13% 16%
12 3.00-5.00 7 2.40-3.80 20% 24%
11 3.00-5.00 6 2.20-3.40 27% 32%
10 3.00-5.00 5 2.00-3.00 33% 40%
9 2.80-4.60 4 1.80-2.60 36% 43%
8 2.60-4.20 3 1.60-2.20 38% 48%
7 2.40-3.80 2 1.40-1.80 42% 53%
6 2.20-3.40 1 1.20-1.40 45% 59%
5 2.00-3.00 0 1.05-1.20 48% 60%
4 1.80-2.60 -1 1.05-1.20 42% 54%
3 1.60-2.20 -2 1.05-1.20 34% 45%
2 1.40-1.80 -3 1.05-1.20 25% 33%
1 1.20-1.40 -4 1.05-1.20 13% 14%
0 1.05-1.20 -5 1.05-1.20 0% 0%
tion to induce firms to adopt truly effective compliance programs that
materially increase the probability that crimes are detected. Mitigation is
especially important since organizations cannot get compliance program
mitigation unless they promptly self-report any detected wrongdoing.
Thus, the amount of mitigation must be sufficient to not only induce the
firm to aggressively attempt to detect crimes, but also to report detected
wrongs to the government (which materially enhances the probability
that the government can convict it).
In order to understand the problems plaguing the Guidelines' provi-
sions governing compliance programs, we first need to determine what
should be the goal of a sentencing regime vis-A-vis corporate compli-
ance. Corporate compliance programs are designed to deter violations
directly by training employees and shifting corporate culture. They also
are designed to deter crime indirectly by increasing the probability that
wrongs will be detected, thereby increasing the excepted sanction for
corporate crime (where the latter is the sanction amount multiplied by
the probability of sanction). Both the indirect and direct effects of com-
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pliance programs benefit society by deterring crimes. The magnitude of
this benefit equals the social cost of the crimes deterred. Society benefits
when firms adopt all cost-justified compliance program measures: mea-
sures where the social benefit of the crimes deterred equals or exceeds
the social cost of the compliance measure.
It might seem that the state could induce firms to adopt all cost-
justified compliance measures by holding them strictly liable for their
employees' crimes, subject to an expected sanction that equals the social
cost of the crime. It might seem that this ensures that firms would adopt
any compliance measure where the cost of the measure is less than or
equal to the social benefit of the crimes deterred. This is not the case.
The problem is that a firm held strictly liable for its employees' crimes
(and subject to a fixed fine) obtains less benefit from compliance than
does society. True it gets the benefit of the crimes deterred. But effective
compliance programs designed to detect wrongdoing impose a cost on
firms subject to strict corporate liability in the form of an increase in the
firm's expected liability for any crimes that are committed. Absent sub-
stantial sanction mitigation, firms held liable for their employees' crimes
face the real possibility that adopting an effective compliance program
will increase the firm's expected liability for its employees' crimes. The
best way for the state to ensure that the threat of criminal penalties does
not deter the adoption of a compliance program is to structure penalties
so that there is no liability enhancement effect. Specifically, the govern-
ment should subject firms to a lower penalty if they had an effective
compliance program and should ensure that the amount of mitigation at
least equals the effect of an effective compliance program on the
probability that any crime committed will be detected and sanctioned
(assuming that the firm reports any detected wrongs).7
Examining the Organizational Guidelines, we see that they do pro-
vide some firms with strong incentives to adopt a compliance program.
Nevertheless, they do not provide adequate incentives in those situations
where an effective compliance program is most important-firms with a
past history of wrongdoing or where the crime is committed or con-
doned by managers. To see this, consider Table Five. Table Five reveals
that firms with an unmitigated culpability score over five receive little
mitigation for adopting an effective compliance program. The firms
74. For a discussion of the precise conditions governing the optimal minimum amount of
mitigation, see generally Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3. For a discussion of why the state
should focus on eliminating the liability enhancement effect if firms obtain the full social benefit
of any crimes they deter, see Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 57-59. The
probability of sanction should be based on the probability of sanction when the firm reports
detected wrongdoing because firms only get credit for adopting an effective compliance program
if they promptly report any wrongs they detect. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(f)(2).
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TABLE FIVE
IMPACT ON CORPORATE FINE OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM (3PT)
Unmitigated Mitigated Reduction Reduction
Culpability Mitigated Mimu Mamm
Score Multiplier Culpability Multiplier Minimum Maximum
(Min-Max) Score Multiplier Multiplier
14 2.00-4.00 11 2.00-4.00 0% 0%
13 2.00-4.00 10 2.00-4.00 0% 0%
12 2.00-4.00 9 1.80-3.60 10% 10%
11 2.00-4.00 8 1.60-3.20 20% 20%
10 2.00-4.00 7 1.40-2.80 30% 30%
9 1.80-3.60 6 1.20-2.40 33% 33%
8 1.60-3.20 5 1.00-2.00 38% 38%
7 1.40-2.80 4 0.80-1.60 43% 43%
6 1.20-2.40 3 0.60-1.20 50% 50%
5 1.00-2.00 2 0.40-0.80 60% 60%
4 0.80-1.60 1 0.20-0.40 75% 75%
3 0.60-1.20 0 0.05-0.20 92% 83%
2 0.40-0.80 -1 0.05-0.20 88% 75%
1 0.20-0.40 -2 0.05-0.20 75% 50%
0 0.05-0.20 -3 0.05-0.20 0% 0%
likely to fall into this category are firms that were previously found to
have committed a similar offense by civil or criminal authorities and
firms with wrongdoing that implicates high-level personnel or multiple
supervisory authority personnel. Providing anemic mitigation to these
firms is perverse because it is particularly important for a firm to have
an effective compliance program if the firm faces a material risk of
wrongdoing by people in authority within the firm or the firm has a
previous history of wrongdoing, such that there is a heightened risk of
future wrongdoing.
To see the problems with the Organizational Guidelines, consider a
firm with 1,000 or more employees that anticipates managerial involve-
ment in any criminal activity. This firm is eligible for only a 30-33%
reduction in the criminal fine for adopting an effective compliance pro-
gram, even if that program materially enhances the firm's ability to
detect the wrong and provides the government with important evidence.
This 30-33% reduction in the penalty is not very large, especially when
compared to the negative consequences to the firm of adopting a compli-
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ance program. After all, a compliance program, when effective, can
materially enhance the likelihood that the firm detects any violations that
occur. It also can materially enhance the government's ability to obtain
evidence about the crime should the government detect the wrong on its
own. As a result, an effective compliance program can materially
enhance the likelihood that the firm not only pays a criminal fine, as
well as criminal restitution/remediation, government-imposed civil pen-
alties, and also (in some cases) private civil sanctions. Accordingly, a
firm contemplating a compliance program that will not deter all wrongs,
and that can increase the probability that the government detects and
sanctions the wrong by more than 30-33%, would be better off
refraining from adopting the program in favor of "cosmetic compliance"
if the firm expects its sanctions to be governed by the Organizational
Guidelines.
To elucidate further, consider a firm with 1,000 employees that
expects that seven crimes could occur over a given period of time if it
does not adopt a compliance program. Assume that the probability that
the government can detect and sanction these crimes is only 1/10 if the
firm does not assist by adopting a compliance program. Assume that the
firm can adopt a compliance program, at cost C, that would more than
double the probability of detection (and sanction) from 1/10 to 1/4.
Assume that three crimes would be deterred by this increase in individ-
ual wrongdoers' probability of being sanctioned. Now consider the
effect of the Organizational Guidelines. Let F be the unmitigated fine.
The firm would face an expected sanction of 7(1/10)F if it does not
adopt an effective compliance program, and expected costs of C + 4(1/
4)(.67)(F) if it does. Assume moreover that the compliance program
would cost as much to implement as the expected sanction for one
(unmitigated crime). Given this, the firm will compare (6/10)F.6(F) with
(4/4)(.67)F=(.67)F. Since the latter is greater than the former, the firm is
better off if it does not adopt an effective compliance program than if it
does, because the amount of mitigation granted for having a compliance
program is less than the beneficial effect of compliance on the
probability that crimes are detected and sanctioned.
To illustrate further, assume that a firm expects one violation to
occur per period, with or without a compliance program, but potentially
values the compliance program because it would double the firm's abil-
ity to detect each violation from 50% to 100%. In this situation, the firm
would be deterred from adopting the compliance program by the Guide-
lines, even if the enforcement staff reassures the firm that it would grant
full mitigation for an effective compliance program that detects viola-
75. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 746-47.
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tions tolerated by substantial authority personnel notwithstanding the
presumption against it. The Guidelines would deter compliance because
this firm would face a potential sanction of two to four times the base
fine7 6 if it does not adopt an effective compliance program-but the firm
would face only a 50% chance of its wrongdoing being detected and
sanctioned. This translates into an expected sanction that is one to two
times the base fine-where the expected sanction is the actual sanction
multiplied by the probability of the sanction being imposed. By contrast,
if the firm adopts an effective compliance program, and reports all
detected wrongdoing, it would be subject to a penalty of 1.4-2.8 times
the base penalty, but it would face this penalty with certainty. Thus,
adopting a compliance program would increase the firm's expected pen-
alty from one to two times to 1.4-2.8 times the base penalty, if it is
granted mitigation.
Thus, even though the Guidelines reduce the actual penalty, the
firm's expected (probability-adjusted) penalty is higher if it adopts an
effective compliance program than if it does not. This is because the
Guidelines do not grant sufficient mitigation to counteract the increased
risk of detection and sanction for firms with effective compliance pro-
grams that promptly report. As a result, the firm would be much better
off not adopting an effective program to detect violations."
The Organizational Guidelines provide even less incentive for firms
to adopt a compliance program if the firm potentially faces an unmiti-
gated culpability score that exceeds ten because firms with culpability
scores of ten and higher are subject to the same penalty multipliers.
Thus, reducing the firm's culpability score from fourteen to ten has no
effect on the fine to which it can be subject. This undermines the incen-
tives of many large firms to adopt an effective compliance program.
To see this, consider a firm with a pre-mitigation culpability score
of eleven because it is a large firm (over 5,000 employees), supervisory
authority personnel tolerated the violation, and it had a prior violation.
Assume that the firm is able to demonstrate that its compliance program
was effective and thus is eligible for the three points of penalty mitiga-
tion awarded to firms that adopt an effective compliance program (and
76. This is because the firm receives a base culpability score of five plus an increase of five
points for the participation of high-level personnel in a large organization, resulting in a score of
ten points, which produces a multiplier of two to four times the base penalty.
77. Thus, the Organizational Guidelines only encourage firms to adopt effective compliance
programs when the deterrence effect of a compliance program-as measured by the benefit to the
firm of the reduction in the expected number of wrongs resulting from adoption of the program-
exceeds the firm's enhanced expected liability for each violation that occurs notwithstanding its
compliance program under the anemic mitigation provisions for compliance in the Organizational
Guidelines. See generally Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1; Arlen & Kraakman,
supra note 3.
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also self-report). For this firm, the three points of mitigation translates
into only two points of mitigation, since it gets no credit for the move
from eleven to ten. Thus, the firm is left with a mitigated penalty equal
to 80% of the unmitigated penalty. This expected burden is more likely
to deter genuine efforts to detect wrongdoing than encourage them.
Indeed, the problem is worse than the preceding analysis suggests
because effective compliance programs increase the firm's probability of
being subject to a variety of sanctions beyond the criminal fine. These
include criminal restitution as well as government and private civil pen-
alties. Yet, as previously mentioned, the Guidelines only reduce the
criminal fine, and not other sanctions. Thus, the percentage reduction in
the firm's expected sanction produced by the Guidelines is lower than
Table Five would suggest. Thus, the Guidelines may deter firms from
adopting an effective compliance program even if the compliance pro-
gram would increase the probability of sanction by less than the percent-
age of mitigation of the criminal fine.
Moreover, the Guidelines' mitigation provisions do not provide
adequate incentives for firms to adopt compliance programs even if the
firm does not expect managers to be complicit in the crime. Here the
problem lies with the interaction between the mitigation provisions for
having an effective compliance program and those for reporting, cooper-
ating, and accepting responsibility. A firm that does not expect high
level personnel to be complicit can expect to have an unmitigated culpa-
bility score of five. Firms with a culpability score of five derive little
genuine benefit from having a compliance program as long as the firm is
much better able to detect crime than is the government. This is because
the firm knows that if a crime occurs, it will detect it first. In this case,
the firm can obtain five points of mitigation for self-reporting, cooperat-
ing, and accepting responsibility. It accordingly has no reason to also
adopt a compliance program, especially since the firm is only entitled to
mitigation for the compliance program if it self-reports any crimes it
detects. Accordingly, when the firm does not expect the government to
detect the wrong before it does, the firm obtains little marginal benefit
from having an effective compliance program. In this situation, the firm
often will be better off not adopting an effective compliance program
(while still self-reporting any wrongs it happens to detect). As a result of
this structure, the Guidelines' mitigation provisions do not encourage
firms to adopt compliance programs aimed at detecting wrongs by non-
managerial employees if the firm has no prior history and expects that it
will learn of any violations before the government authorities do.
Thus, the Guidelines' mitigation provisions governing compliance
programs fail to achieve the important objective of encouraging firms to
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adopt measures designed to detect violations of the law because these
provisions do not grant sufficient mitigation-either alone or in con-
cert-to ensure that firms face lower expected penalties if they intervene
effectively to detect violations than if they do not. This failure to grant
adequate mitigation for compliance is particularly troubling because the
Guidelines should be encouraging firms to adopt effective compliance
programs because the government can best reduce and remedy the harm
caused by violations if it can induce firms to help it detect them as
quickly as possible. Thus, the Sentencing Commission should restruc-
ture the Guidelines to ensure that they provide firms substantial financial
incentives to undertake each of these activities-detection, reporting,
and full cooperation-separately and together.
3. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROACH TO MITIGATION
Careful consideration of the incentives created by the Organiza-
tional Guidelines reveals that they do not serve a central goal of helping
to deter crime by inducing firms to adopt effective compliance pro-
grams, self-report, or fully cooperate. Indeed, in many circumstances,
the Organizational Guidelines discourage firms from investing in mea-
sures to detect and report evidence of wrongdoing and assist in the con-
viction of individual wrongdoers.
The conclusion that the Organizational Guidelines are ineffective is
consistent with the Department of Justice's decision to adopt its own
approach to sanction mitigation for corporate policing. In the early
1990s, firms whose employees committed federal crimes in the scope of
employment faced a de jure regime of strict corporate criminal liability;
the criminal sanctions imposed were determined by the Organizational
Guidelines. Thus, firms faced the threat of criminal liability whenever an
employee committed a crime for which it was vicariously criminally lia-
ble. Under this approach, judges could grant mitigation to firms that
adopted a compliance program, but only in certain circumstances.
They also could grant credit for self-reporting and cooperating, but, as
shown above, the amount of mitigation was not sufficient to truly
encourage firms to adopt effective compliance programs, self-report
crimes that otherwise might go undetected, and fully cooperate with
government investigations.
Recognizing the need to provide firms with stronger incentives to
78. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(f)(3). Also, at the time under the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, firms adopting a compliance program were not entitled to sanction
mitigation if a person within the organization's high-level or supervisory authority personnel
participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense. See supra text accompanying
note 24.
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detect crimes, report them, and fully cooperate, in 1999 then-Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder effectively adopted an alternative regime
to govern the sanctioning of firms that adopted an effective compliance
program, self-reported, or fully cooperated with federal authorities. 9 He
issued a set of guidelines to prosecutors outlining the factors that prose-
cutors should consider in deciding whether to prosecute a corporation
for its employees' crimes. Of particular importance, the Holder Memo
stated that, in deciding whether to exempt a corporation from prosecu-
tion, prosecutors should consider the effectiveness of the firm's compli-
ance program, whether it promptly reported the crime, and its level of
cooperation with the government.o
In contrast to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, prosecu-
tors governed by the Holder Memo (and the prosecutorial guidelines that
superseded it)"' can grant firms full insulation from prosecution in return
for satisfying their corporate policing duties. Moreover, prosecutors can,
and regularly do, decide not to indict a firm for its employees' criminal
conduct, even when the firm only partially satisfied its policing duties.8 2
In particular, the prosecutorial guidelines permit full leniency even if the
firm did not have an effective compliance program. Prosecutors often
do not indict firms that fully cooperate with federal authorities." This
stands in dramatic contrast with the Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines, under which firms are subject to conviction even if they had an
effective compliance program, self-reported, and fully cooperated. This
distinction is important to the extent that firms convicted of crimes are
subject to collateral penalties or reputation sanctions not imposed on
79. The Holder Memo was the first effort to adopt a duty-based regime applicable to a broad
range of federal corporate crimes. Prior to the Holder Memo, individual U.S. Attorneys had
employed non-prosecution to encourage cooperation. Moreover, individual federal enforcement
authorities also had adopted similar policies governing specific crimes. Arlen, Corporate Criminal
Liability, supra note 1, at 10-11. For a discussion of the evolution of the federal corporate
criminal enforcement, see Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone:
Directors' Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIEs 330-31 (J. Mark Ramseyer
ed., 2009).
80. Holder Memo, supra note 18, § II.A.4-6.
81. See id. § II.B.
82. See sources cited supra note 79 (discussing the evolution of corporate criminal
enforcement); see also supra note 19 and citations therein (discussing DPAs and NPAs).
83. The conclusion that firms that cooperate can get full leniency even if the firm did not have
an effective compliance program follows from a review of the DOJ's DPAs and NPAs. Many (if
not most) of these agreements require firms to adopt compliance programs containing specific
features-mandates that would not be necessary if prosecutors only granted leniency to firms that
already had effective compliance programs. For a discussion of the content of the DOJ's DPAs
and NPAs, see, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 19; Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra
note 19; Spivack & Raman, supra note 19; see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 19.
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firms subject to purely civil penalties.84
The DOJ also appears to deviate from the Organizational Guide-
lines in determining the magnitude of any penalties imposed on firms
that engage in effective policing. Under the DOJ's non-prosecution pol-
icy, firms granted protection from indictment generally are required to
pay a penalty, as well as remediation, which is imposed on them through
a DPA or NPA.15 In determining the magnitude of this penalty, prosecu-
tors are free to take into account the firm's good behavior, including its
compliance efforts. In contrast with the original Organizational Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, under the DOJ's non-prosecution policy, prosecutors can
reduce the penalty for a firm with an effective compliance program even
if the violation involved high-level personnel and the firm did not detect
the crime. Moreover, the magnitude of sanction mitigation for firms that
avoid prosecution by policing often is significantly greater than the
amount available under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. In
part, this is because the leniency program enables firms to avoid the
enormous collateral consequences of a conviction, whereas the Organi-
zational Sentencing Guidelines do not. In addition, unlike the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines, under the DOJ's leniency program,
prosecutors can decide not to impose a criminal fine at all. While the
firm may be subject to a penalty imposed through a NPA or DPA, the
DOJ has the freedom to ensure that firms have lower total sanctions
(criminal and civil) than would be imposed if criminal penalties were
determined by the Organizational Guidelines." The DOJ's decision to
ensure that firms are able to get a substantially greater benefit for effec-
tive compliance, self-reporting, and full cooperation than is available
under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines appears to reflect the
DOJ's recognition that it cannot achieve its central corporate enforce-
ment goal of deterring corporate crime unless it grants far more mitiga-
tion for good corporate conduct, in a broader set of circumstances, than
would be permitted under the Organizational Guidelines."
The DOJ policy highlights that the problems with the Organiza-
tional Guidelines identified here are real. Unfortunately, the DOJ policy
is not a complete solution to these problems because, notwithstanding
the DOJ policy, there are situations where the Organizational Guidelines
still are important. In particular, some firms are convicted even though
84. See generally Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 (discussing collateral and
market-based sanctions for corporate crime).
85. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 19 (discussing the content of these agreements); see also
Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 19 (discussing the same).
86. This is based on an examination of NPAs and DPAs on file with the author.
87. The original Guidelines had additional flaws beyond those discussed here, as do the
current Guidelines. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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they self-reported the wrong, had an effective compliance program, or
cooperated." Firms that expect to be convicted for the crimes their
employees commit thus continue to look to the Guidelines to determine
whether they should adopt a truly effective compliance program, self-
report detected wrongs, and fully cooperate. The present analysis of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines reveals that many firms in this sit-
uation will conclude that they should not pursue these corporate policing
measures. Thus, the Guidelines fail to achieve a vital enforcement objec-
tive of inducing effective corporate monitoring, self-reporting, and coop-
eration. The Sentencing Commission thus should redraft its Guidelines
to more effectively encourage detection, self-reporting, and full coopera-
tion by organizations.
4. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Commission could have benefitted both potential
victims of crimes and firms by adopting Sentencing Guidelines designed
to deter violations by inducing effective corporate policing. Consumers
and firms both would have benefitted from the heightened incentives to
pursue aggressive corporate policing that effective guidelines can pro-
vide. Unfortunately, the Sentencing Commission failed to adopt Guide-
lines that adequately encourage firms to help detect, self-report, and
sanction wrongdoing. Indeed, the Organizational Guidelines may
actively deter some firms from adopting effective policing measures
designed to deter wrongdoing-for example, compliance, self-reporting,
and cooperation-because they impose a greater expected penalty on
firms that undertake these desired activities than on those that do not.
Firms cannot be relied on to invest in measures that help govern-
ment authorities detect and sanction wrongdoing unless the Sentencing
Commission structures its Guidelines to ensure that firms face lower
expected sanctions when they monitor, self-report, and fully-cooperate
than when they do not. Yet, the Organizational Guidelines do not grant
enough mitigation for adopting effective compliance programs, self-
reporting, or cooperating to induce organizations to actively pursue these
measures. Indeed, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines create the
largest disincentive to engage in effective policing in the very situation
where it is most needed: where the firm is substantially better able to
detect and sanction violations if firms monitor, self-report, and fully
cooperate. Moreover, the Guidelines grant proportionately less mitiga-
tion to large firms than to many smaller ones, all else equal. Thus, these
88. See supra note 22 (explaining how the Guidelines remain relevant notwithstanding the
DOJ's leniency policy because firms that cooperate continue to be convicted and sentenced under
the Guidelines).
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guidelines perversely discourage policing by the very organizations-
large complex organizations-that we most want to invest in optimal
policing.
The DOJ has reduced the negative effect of the Organizational
Guidelines through a non-prosecution policy that enables firms that
engage in effective corporate policing to avoid conviction-and thus to
also have their sanction determined outside the Guidelines. Neverthe-
less, not all firms that have effective compliance programs or self-report
wrongs are sanctioned through this leniency policy. To the extent that
the Organizational Guidelines thus remain effective, it is vital that the
Sentencing Commission revise them to provide adequate mitigation for
compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation.
